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THE FUNCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF A
JUDICIAL COUNCIL*
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND**
That keen interpreter of the Greek Commonwealth, and bril-
liant critic of contemporary politics, Alfred Zimmern, has re-
cently observed that "the establishment of a right relation
between Knowledge and Power is the central problem of mod-
ern democracy.' He was discussing the complexities of gov-
ernmental organization and functions resulting from the theory,
already well established in England, that the state is an instru-
ment for securing the highest measure of well-being to those
who live under its protection. While the old type of a "police
state" sought to do little more than maintain order and protect
property, by means of a routine administration, the new ideals
of democracy are forcing governments to undertake a wide
variety of economic and social services. This has made neces-
sary the employment of skilled administrators and expert ad-
visors of many types. For the vast and intricate activities
being developed by government, the mechanism of control has
become so complex that only those with ability and special train-
ing are competent either to design or operate it. In order to
succeed the government must be able to command the skill of
experts. Hence the conclusion of Mr. Zimmern, that the estab-
lishment of a right relation between Knowledge and Power is
the central problem facing the modern state.
* An address delivered to the Indiana State Bar Association, January
19, 1934.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
'Democracy and the Expert, 1 Pol. Quar. (1930) 7.
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The great wealth and seemingly inexhaustible resources of
the United States have postponed for us the incidence of this
new phase of governmental activity. While European nations
have been gradually extending the sphere of state control we
have continued to maintain the familiar individualism of a
pioneer people to whom the frontier always offered a means
of escape for those who were too heavily oppressed by the re-
strictions of our civilization.
But much of our wealth has vanished, our resources are
diminishing and the frontier has gone. The huge industrial
machine, which we thought would run forever, has stalled. The
problems of society can no longer be solved by the iidividuals
upon whom they press. Only the power of the State seems ade-
quate for the task, and with a sudden realization of the neces-
sity for an organized effort to correct the social and economic
abuses which we have too long endured, the United States has
plunged into a program for accomplishing almost in a day what
England has been working upon for a generation.
The plan upon which we have embarked involves a vast over-
turning of conventional theories regarding the rights and duties
of individuals and of various social and economic units, groups
and institutions. So far as it does so, it affects all classes of
society, and raises problems in which all are concerned. But it
is certain to have a more specific and fundamental effect upon
the legal profession. In order to bring about the readjustments
which are sought, and to maintain them in proper equilibrium,
It is necessary that there should be adequate procedural machin-
ery available for the purpose. Rights without remedies lack
substance. Only as ways and means can be found for enforcing
rights and duties, can the new ideals for a better social order
become realities. While, therefore, the question of enforcement
underlies the entire problem of social and economic reconstruc-
tion, and broadly concerns the general welfare of everyone
whose interests are affected by the new principles of social jus-
tice, it bears with peculiar intensity upon that social group
whose professional activity is primarily devoted to the adminis-
tration of justice.
Remedial law is of two types, judicial and administrative.
The first is chiefly concerned with individual rights and duties
relating to contract, property and personal security. This has
heretofore constituted the major interest of the legal profession.
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The second deals primarily with the services rendered by gov-
ernment and with the establishment and maintenance of socially
desirable standards of individual conduct and business practice.
This is a modern development based upon the idea that the state
should function as an instrument for promoting social and eco-
nomic well-being. Its rapidly widening scope and growing im-
portance present vast possibilities of usefulness for the bar in
protecting the public from the inevitable tyrannigs of bureau-
cracy, provided the profession can rise to the occasion and devote
its experience and skill to the development and employment of
adequate procedural practices.
While the bar performs functions which are monopolistic in
character, it does not follow that its services cannot be dispensed
with. This is obvious in the field of administrative law, where
the initiative in instituting and conducting the proceedings is
lodged almost entirely in the official staff of the bureau or com-
mission. It is only in so far as lawyers can demonstrate their
ability to contribute to the efficiency of the proceedings or to the
desirability of the results, that they will become an important
factor in this branch of the administration of justice.
But the same is also true, to a very large extent, in the field
of judicial remedies. While under our scheme of court organi-
zation, lawyers constitute a necessary part of the machinery of
justice, the courts themselves may be relegated to a much less
important place in the scheme of government than we have been
accustomed to accord to them.
The services ordinarily rendered by the courts are not abso-
lutely indispensable, but only relatively so. The extent of their
use depends upon their speed, their convenience, the expense in-
volved, and the degree of success with which predicted results
can be actually obtained. As more and more time is consumed
in efforts to obtain relief, as disturbance to the business and to
the peace of mind of the litigant increases, as expenses mount
and hazards multiply, other means may be found for liquidating
disputes. Losses may be charged off and forgotten, settlements
may be entered into, and arbitrations may be effected. Further-
more, the government may come to the aid of those who find
the processes of the courts too slow, costly and uncertain, and
may set up administrative offices, tribunals or bureaus, operat-
ing in a simple and summary manner, in which any inferiority
in the quality of the remedy may be at least partly counter-
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balanced by the ease and speed with which it can be obtained.
This latter process cannot be considered a normal development
of administrative law. It is rather an arbitrary transfer of
jurisdiction from a judicial to an administrative tribunal. The
subject matter concerns private rights, and therefore appro-
priately belongs within the field of judicial control. Dissatisfac-
tion with the manner in which the courts perform, rather than
doubt regarding their inherent fitness for the task, is in such
cases the sole reason for depriving them of jurisdiction and
turning the matter over to an administrative agency.
These methods of escape from an unsatisfactory judicial ad-
ministration of the law, are neither novel in theory nor unfa-
miliar in practice. Fortunately, however, they do not represent
the first stage of popular discontent. The English tradition in
favor of recourse to the courts has been strong and persistent,
and the first reaction of the public has always been to attempt
to improve the judicial machinery rather than to substitute
either private adjustments or administrative control. The pro-
cess of revolt may therefore be considered as a cycle with three
phases, the first representing a constructive but ineffectual ef-
fort to obtain better service by means of judicial remedies, the
second constituting a refusal to employ the unsatisfactory facili-
ties offered by the courts, and the third resulting in the creation
of new administrative agencies for giving the relief not other-
wise obtainable on reasonable teams.
This cycle has been frequently repeated, in various forms, but
always with damaging effect, each recurrence leaving the courts
with their field of activity contracted and their prestige
impaired.
If, when the cycle begins, the needed reforms can be brought
about, the occasion for the succeeding phases of revolt will never
arise. The initial desire of the public is always to improve and
preserve, not to destroy, the system. They wish better results
from the use of familiar machinery, and it is only when efforts
in this direction fail that they turn in self-defense to private
devices of their own or seek by legislation to substitute the sum-
mary administrative jurisdiction of government bureaus or com-
missions for the ineffective processes of the courts.
It may well be questioned whether the public has not lost more
than it has gained by resort to these revolutionary methods of
escape from the courts. Burdens of one kind may have been
merely exchanged for other burdens no less heavy. And if the
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public is to seek relief from judicial procedure at its worst, by
abandoning the courts, the beneficial possibilities of that pro-
cedure at its best will never be realized.
That such possibilities are very great, however, cannot be
doubted.
Disillusioned creditors may write down or abandon unim-
peachable claims rather than go through the prolonged agony
of a law suit. But it is not at all necessary for a case to drag
on to the time of trial to enable the claimant to establish his
right. The existence of a defense worthy of judicial cognizance
may itself be tried, immediately, summarily, and upon affidavits,
and if none is found the case may end then and there, and a
judgment be given at once in behalf of the creditor. In other
words, a prompt and effective judicial method of collecting debts
is entirely practicable. It should be available to every creditor.2
Parties accept unfair settlements and relinquish valuable
rights rather than become involved in litigation. But a settle-
ment itself might properly become the definite objective of a
judicial proceeding. Conciliation has long been a familiar field
for judicial action in Scandinavian countries.3 It has been em-
ployed in a few of the American states in small claims courts,
and conciliation divisions have occasionally been established in
municipal courts.4 But professional indifference has largely pre-
vented any serious effort to develop judicial remedies for those
who prefer to settle rather than litigate.
Even apprehension resulting from insecurity and peril may
be relieved by judicial action, through the use of declaratory
judgments.5
2 Summary judgment procedure of a very effective type has long been
used in England (Order 14, Rule 1). It accounts for 80% of all the judg-
ments rendered in the King's Bench Division. See Civil Judicial Statistics,
England and Wales, 1931, Table IX, p. 16. Michigan (Rule 30, Revision
of 1931) and Illinois (Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933) Ch. 110, sees. 57, 102; Ct.
Rule 15) have a practice very similar to that in England. New York
(Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice) has gone still farther. See Sum-
mary Judgment procedure, by Edward R. Finch (1933), 19 Am. B. Assn.
Jour. (Sept.) 504.
a The Danish Conciliation System and Conciliation in Norway, by Regi-
nald Heber Smith (1926), Dept. of Labor Bulletin, Wash., D. C.; (1927)
11 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 85.
4 Justice and the Poor, by Reginald Heber Smith (1919), Ch. IX; Bull.
XV Am. Jud. Soc. (1920).
5 Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, by Edwin M. Borchard
(1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 793-854; Judicial Relief for Insecurity, by the
same author (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 648-680.
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Arbitration, which largely represents a protest against pro-
fessional unwillingness to provide satisfactory ways of dealing
with disputed questions of fact, has accomplished little in the
field of private controversies which the courts, if properly organ-
ized and operated, could not have done better, and it has raised a
cloud of new problems which greatly limit its usefulness.6
All the special advantages claimed for arbitration, namely, the
judgment of experts upon technical questions, informality of
procedure, and avoidance of publicity, could be obtained by the
flexible judicial remedy of a reference.7 At the same time the
parties would thereby enjoy the enormous advantage of compe-
tent judicial supervision, a wide choice of familiar and well es-
tablished remedial processes, and the security of a status result-
ing from the exercise of judicial power. Most of the technical
difficulties encountered in the resort to arbitration would never
arise in ancillary judicial proceedings, carried on under the
superintending control of a judge having authority to employ
all the judicial power of the court in doing complete justice be-
tween the parties.8
Merely transferring controversies essentially judicial to ad-
ministrative tribunals is not a satisfactory solution of the prob-
lems of court organization and procedure. The proper function
of such tribunals is entirely different from that of the courts.
They are equipped to investigate, legislate and execute, to de-
termine policies and to prescribe conduct; to construe and make
effective laws by which the state grants licenses and privileges,
supplies services, or controls social and economic relations. But
6 The huge mass of decisions upon the technique of arbitration dis-
cussed in Sturges on Commercial Arbitration and Awards (1930), and the
enormous variety of questions litigated, is eloquent testimony that the
system is far from perfect.
7 Even the further advantage which Professor Isaacs believes is fre-
quently sought, namely, escape from legalistic standards of decision and
the substitution of contractual standards better suited to the particular
needs of the parties, could be had under such a procedure. See, Two Views
of Commercial Arbitration, by Nathan Isaacs (1927), 40 Harv. L. Rev. 929.
8 There is nothing inherently impractical in a system of arbitration
operating entirely within, rather than outside, the jurisdiction of the court.
(c. f. The Scope and Limitation of Commercial Arbitration, by Dean Har-
lan F. (now Mr. Justice) Stone (1923), X Proc. Acad. of Pol. Sci. of
N. Y., No. 3, p. 501, 507.) Under such a system questions relating to the
construction, validity, scope and effect of the arbitration agreement could
be judicially determined in making or refusing an order of reference, and
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administrative bodies have neither a tradition nor a procedural
equipment which enables them to assess conflicting evidence and
to determine how the law should be applied to difficult and doubt-
ful situations. Because they constantly act upon their own
initiative in the interest of the public, considerations of efficiency
outweigh regard for private rights.9 They tend to develop a
routine and to become arbitrary and overbearing.
Experience with workmen's compensation boards has by no
means demonstrated the superiority of administrative tribunals
in dealing with industrial accidents. And yet no effort has been
made to use broad powers and flexible processes of the courts in
developing a really efficient method of dealing with these cases.
A still more critical issue has arisen out of automobile accident
litigation. Are these cases to be taken out of the courts and
administered by a commission?10
If the administration of justice is to meet the needs of the
public, a thorough testing and overhauling of the organization
and operation of courts, commissions and other cognate agencies
must take place. New methods must be devised and old methods
reformed or applied to new uses. Venue must be made more
convenient, service of process simplified, ex parte pleadings
must surrender their dominant position in litigation, greater use
must be made of discovery before trial, of judicial framing of
issues, and of proof by affidavit and by admissions of parties,
procedural rules must be directory, not mandatory, actual preju-
dice must be the indispensable basis for all procedural objec-
tions, rules of evidence must be radically revised, calendars
must be arranged in a way to avoid the shocking waste of time
the same would be true of the qualifications, selection and powers of the
arbitrators who might constitute the board of reference; objections to the
proceedings could be given prompt judicial attention and irregularities
could be so dealt with, under a broad judicial discretion, as to correct or
cure them or minimize their harmful effect; awards could be modified, cor-
rected or vacated under the direction of the court without difficulty or
undue delay, and they could be reduced to appropriate judgments as a
matter of course or on motion, and the distinctions now drawn between
common law and statutory arbitrations would no longer serve any proced-
ural or jurisdictional purpose.
9 Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, by Ernst Freund
(1928), p. 8.
10 Report of the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents, Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
(1932); Summary of results given in 32 Col. I, Rev. (1932) 785-824.
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on the part of judges, lawyers and witnesses which has become
familiar practice, better cooperation between judge and jury
must be reestablished, a much more comprehensive system of
references and auxiliary administrative machinery must be de-
veloped, the economic waste and legal risks of new trials must
be reduced, the mechanism for the review of judgments must be
enormously simplified and cheapened, courts must be unified and
judicial personnel be subject to mobilization wherever needed,
and better methods must be devised for the selection and retire-
ment of judges.
These problems are intricate, pressing and of vital concern to
society. How can they be solved?
I recur again to the suggestion with which I began, that the
establishment of a right relation between Knowledge and Power
is the central problem of modern democracy. In regulating the
administration of justice, power is vested primarily in the legis-
lature, secondarily in the court in so far as it makes rules of
practice. Knowledge rests with the legal profession. Only law-
yers are fully able to analyze and appraise procedural processes,
to understand procedural problems, to identify the difficulties
which obstruct, and to suggest feasible measures for relief. As
judges they sit upon the courts, and as practitioners they medi-
ate between the client on one hand and the court or commission
on the other. They know what the public wants, they know
what the various tribunals give, they can understand and ap-
praise the possibilities for improvement and the conditions and
limitations which must be taken into account. In short, the legal
profession is the one adequate source of the Knowledge which
must be brought into proper relations with Power for the salva-
tion of justice in the State.
If the profession were to undertake this task of integration,
and should organize a representative group among its members
charged with responsibility for devising and proposing methods
for improving the administration of justice, that group would
have exactly the task which is now assigned in a score of states
to the Judicial Council.
But judicial councils as actually organized do not represent
the legal profession. Every judicial council act seems to have
been drawn with the conscious purpose of severely restricting
the representation of the dominant branch of the profession, the
practicing bar.
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The skeptic might say at once that any hope of substantial
reform from either bench or bar would be utterly fatuous, that
professional opposition to reform has always been the chief ob-
stacle to progress, that an organization controlled by the bar
would protect the interests of the public about as effectively as
a committee of wolves would guard a sheepfold.
To this it might be answered that although the record of the
profession has been bad, it cannot be denied that all improve-
ments in legal procedure which have taken place during the long
struggle for a better administration of justice, were due to the
eventual, even though reluctant, assistance of lawyers.1' The
entire judicial council movement was organized and promoted
by them, not by the public. The profession has taken an en-
tirely realistic attitude in the matter, for if legal machinery is
to be improved at all, the task must fall upon lawyers. Only
those who understand the use of a technique are competent to
find and remedy its defects. The choice is not between a plan of
procedural reform which relies upon lawyers and one that does
not. It is a choice between professional direction of reform and
the ultimate abandonment of our whole present system of con-
tentious litigation.
The most striking feature of the judicial council statutes is
the character of the personnel making up their membership.
Although they were drawn by lawyers, the practitioner does not
occupy a dominant place upon any council. In some of them
there are no representatives whatever of the practicing bar, the
whole membership consisting of judges. In others the member-
ship is divided among judges, other public officials, laymen and
practicing lawyers, but there is no state judicial council in which
practicing lawyers as such predominate. All councils, it is true,
are made up largely or entirely of members of the legal profes-
sion, but their qualifications in most instances are fixed with
elaborate reference to the official positions in which they serve.
It is as a judge of this or that particular court, or as attorney
general or prosecuting attorney, or as a member of the legisla-
ture or chairman of a senate or house judiciary committee, or as
a professor of law in a university faculty, rather than as a prac-
ticing lawyer, that the majority of the members of judicial
councils qualify.
"The English experience is described in "The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform," by Edson R. Sunderland (1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev.
725.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
This is so remarkable and characteristic a feature of the com-
position of these bodies that a more detailed glance at the vari-
ous statutes will be of interest. Thus the council of California
consists of 11 members made up of designated judges from each
of 5 courts ;12 that of Connecticut contains 4 judges representing
4 courts, 1 state's attorney, and 4 lawyers ;'& that of Illinois has
5 members of the state senate and 5 members of the house whp
are members of the bar, and 5 practicing lawyers;14 that of
Kansas has 3 judges representing 3 courts, the 2 chairmen of
the legislative judiciary committees and 4 lawyers;15 that of
Kentucky has all the judges of the Court of Appeals and all the
circuit judges of the state ;16 that of Maryland has 6 judges rep-
resenting 4 courts and 3 lawyers ;17 that of Massachusetts has 6
judges or former judges from 6 courts and not more than 4 law-
yers;1s that of Michigan has 3 judges, from 3 courts, the at-
torney general, 1 member of the law faculty of the university,
2 laymen and 3 lawyers ;19 that of New Jersey has 14 members
consisting of 4 judges from 4 courts, the attorney general, the
president of the State Bar Association, the 2 chairmen of the
judiciary committees of the legislature, and 5 practicing law-
yers ;20 that of North Carolina, the most recent council organ-
ized by legislative act, has 2 judges from 2 courts, the attorney
general, the 2 chairmen of the judiciary committees of the legis-
lature, 3 members of university law faculties in the state, 2 lay-
men and 2 practicing lawyers ;21 that of North Dakota has all the
supreme and district court judges in the state, 1 county judge,
the attorney general, the dean of the state university law school,
and 5 practicing lawyers ;22 that of Ohio has 6 judges from 4
courts and 3 lawyers ;2a that of Oregon (subsequently dissolved
by repeal of the act) had 5 judges from thd various courts ;24
that of Rhode Island has 3 judges from 3 courts and 3 practicing
12 Cal. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 1 a.
13 Conn. Gen. Stat., 1930, Sec. 5362.
14 Ill. L. 1929, p. 134; L. 1931, p. 154; L. 1933, p. 138.
15 Kan. R. St., Suppl. of 1931, Sec. 20, 2201.
16 Carroll's Ky. Stat., 1930, Sec. 1126A.
17 Md. Ann. Code, (Bagby), 1924, Art. 26, Sec. 74.
18 Mass. Gen. L., 1932, Ch. 221, Sec. 34A.
19 Mich., C. L., 1929, Sec. 13525.
.20 N. J. Supp. Consol. Stat., 1925-30, Sec. 103.
21 N. C. Code, 1931, Sec. 1461h.
22 N. D., L., 1927, Ch. 124.
23 Throckmorton's Ohio Code, 1930, See. 1697.
24 Ore. Code, 1930, Sec. 28-501. Repealed by L., 1931, Ch. 26.
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lawyers ;25 that of Texas has 16 members consisting of 5 judges
from 3 courts, the attorney general, the 2 chairmen of the Judi-
ciary committees of the legislature, 1 member of the state law
school faculty, 3 laymen, and 4 practicing lawyers;26 that of
Virginia has 5 judges from at least 2 courts and 4 practicing
lawyers ;27 that of Washington has 4 judges from 2 courts, the 2
chairmen of the judiciary committees of the legislature, 1 prose-
cuting attorney, and 3 practicing lawyers ;28 and finally that of
Wisconsin, which functions only as an advisory committee on
rules made by the supreme court, has 2 judges from 2 courts,
the attorney general, the revisor of statutes, the 2 chairmen of
the judiciary committees of the legislature, the president of the
state bar association, and 3 practicing lawyers.
29
Besides these 18 councils created by legislative act, there are
3 councils created by incorporated state bars, but even these fol-
low the same plan of refusing to give the representatives of the
active bar a dominating position in the council. Thus, in Idaho
the council has 5 judges and 5 practicing lawyers;30 in South
Dakota it consists of 5 judges, the attorney general, the dean of
the university law school and 3 practicing lawyers;81 and in
Utah it has 6 judges, I member of the university law school fac-
ulty, 1 prosecuting attorney and 3 practicing lawyers.32
This is an amazing medley of miscellaneous qualifications for
membership.
Corresponding to the variety in the character of the personnel,
is an equally striking diversity in the sources from which the
various members receive their appointments.3 3 Thus, in Cali-
fornia all the members are appointed by the chief justice of the
state. In Connecticut 4 are appointed by the chief justice and 5
by the governor. In Illinois 5 are chosen by the president of the
senate, 5 by the speaker of the house and 5 by the governor. In
Kansas 7 are appointed by the chief justice and 2 are members
25 R. I., L., 1927, Ch. 1038.
26 Texas, L., 1929, Ch. 309.
27 Va., Code, 1930, Sec. 6571f.
28 Wash. L., 1925, Ch. 45.
29 Wis. St., Sec. 251.18.
80 1 Idaho L. Jour. 111 (May, 1931).
31 2 So. Dak. Bar Jour. No. 1, p. 61, (July, 1933), No. 2, p. 100 (Oct.,
1933).
32 1 Utah Bar Bull. 54 (Jan., 1932).
33 The statutes here referred to are the same as those cited above from
the several states having judicial councils.
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ex officio. In Kentucky all higher state judges are members ex
officio. In Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan all are ap-
pointed by the governor. In New Jersey, 4 are appointed by the
chief justice, 1 by the chancellor, 5 by the president of the state
bar association, and 4 are members ex officio. In North Carolina
9 are appointed by the governor and 3 are members ex officio.
In North Dakota 1 is chosen by the supreme court, 5 by the ex-
ecutive committee of the state bar association, and all the su-
preme and district court judges of the state, together with the
dean of the state law school, are members ex officio. In Ohio 3
are chosen by the supreme court, 2 by lower court judges, 3 are
appointed by the governor, and 1 is a member ex officio. In
Oregon 4 were chosen by the chief justice and 1 was a member
ex officio. In Rhode Island 4 are appointed by the governor and
2 are members ex officio. In Texas 3 are chosen by the supreme
court, 2 by the state bar association, 1 by the president of the
state university, 3 are appointed by the governor, and 7 are
members ex officio. In Virginia all are appointed by the chief
justice of the highest court. In Washington 5 are chosen by the
chief justice, 2 by the association of superior judges, and 3 are
members ex officio. And in Wisconsin 2 are chosen by 2 judges'
associations, 3 by the state bar association, and 5 are members
ex officio.
Now, what is the explanation for this extraordinary diversity
in the qualifications of members and sources of appointing
power, and for the numerical distribution of members among the
different classes of personnel?
There are two responsibilities which appear to be placed upon
the judicial council. The first is express, the second is implied.
The first is a very definite responsibility, for formulating and
presenting to the proper authorities suitable measures for pro-
cedural reform. The second is a very indefinite responsibility,
for promoting and facilitating the adoption of the measures
proposed.
It is the first of these responsibilities, dealing with the formu-
lation of better methods of procedure, which seems to invite
much of the diversity found in the qualifications for membership.
There is a certain plausibility in a plan which proposes to
bring together the views of those who look at the operation of
the legal system from all the various angles of scholarly study
and active experience. A body so organized seems to contain
within itself the materials out of which can be constructed an
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ideal scheme for administering the law. The judges drawn from
each court see the particular problems involved in their several
jurisdictions, the attorney general looks at law enforcement in
its relation to the state and to public authorities, the prosecutor
sees it in its relation to crime, the civil practitioner is concerned
with its availability for protecting private rights, the law teacher
views it in its wider implications. An almost self-evident per-
fection would seem to be found in the combined wisdom of all
these observers.
But no body of experts can do very much to solve problems as
complex as those involved in the administration of justice, by
merely exchanging views and comparing experiences. A thor-
ough understanding of any of them requires extensive research
-historical, statistical and comparative, both in the library and
in the field. This the members of the council can rarely do in
person. Ordinarily no studies of any substantial value will be
made without the employment of research workers who will
devote their time to such investigations as the council may
direct. The results obtained can then be interpreted and utilized
by the council for the betterment of legal procedure. It is only
when fortified by adequate investigation, that novel proposals
can be approved with confidence.
Provision for the collection of court data is made in many
judicial council acts by authorizing the council to require reports
to be made to it by clerks and other officers of the courts, 34 and
general investigations are made possible in a number of states
by the authority given to the council to hold public hearings,
subpoena and swear witnesses and require the production of
documents. 35 But under neither of these methods is informa-
tion sought from the members of the Council. They merely pos-
sess the legal authority to obtain it from others.
It follows that if the council does not and cannot supply itself
with adequate data from the personal knowledge of its own mem-
bers, there is no purpose in selecting those members on the basis
of the diversity of the positions they happen to hold in the judi-
34 Cal., Const. Art. VI, See. la; Conn. Gen. St., 1930, See. 5362; Kan.
R. S., Suppl. of 1931, Sec. 20.2205; Carroll's Ky. St., 1930, See. 1126A-4;
Mich. C. L., 1929, See. 13524; N. J. L., 1931, Ch. 354; N. D., L., 1927, Gh.
124, Sec. 7; Ohio, Throckmorton's Code, 1930, Sec. 1697-3; Texas, L., 1929,
Ch. 309, See. 8; Wash., L., 1925, Ch. 45, Sec. 6.
35 Md. Ann. Code (Bagby) 1924, Art. 26, Sec. 77; N. D., L., 1927, Ch.
124, See. 6; Ohio, Throckmorton's Code, 1930, Sec. 1697-4; Texas, L., 1929,
Ch. 309, see. 8; Wash., L., 1925, Ch. 45, See. 7.
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cial system. Their function is to judge not testify. They should
be chosen for personal ability, liberality of mind, imagination,
soundness of judgment, and the strength of their interest in
making the administration of justice a satisfactory public
service.
Sometimes such men will be found on the bench, sometimes
in the legislature or in the attorney general's office, but more
often, perhaps, they will be found among the larger group of
active practitioners at the bar. Wherever found they should be
chosen. The elaborate provisions in most of the judicial council
acts, arbitrarily distributing the membership among the various
offices, judicial and non-judicial, connected with the administra-
tion of the law, are not only useless but detrimental, and serve
rather to defeat than to promote the effectiveness of the council
as an agency for devising improvements in legal procedure.
North Carolina, after five years of experience with a judicial
council which included all the higher judges of the state, and
which accomplished substantially nothing, reorganized its coun-
cil by reducing the membership to 12 and providing that 9 of
them should be appointed on the basis of "interest in and com-
petency for the study of law reform."3 6 This is the only statute
which expressly employs the true test for membership.
The second of the responsibilities resting upon the judicial
council, namely, the implied obligation to make its work effec-
tive through reasonable efforts to bring about the adoption of its
proposals, is given mild support by the common provision that
the council shall make an annual report to the governor or gen-
eral assembly with recommendations for improving procedure,
and shall suggest to the courts needed changes in their rules.ST
But such reports make little impression unless they come from
sources which command respect. Their prestige will be exactly
equal to the prestige of those who submit them. A council with
an officially distinguished personnel will create a presumption of
excellence regarding whatever it may propose. This seems to
36 N. C., L., 1931, Ch. 98. Additional qualifications of the conventional
type were unfortunately also prescribed.
37 Cal., Const. Art. VI, Sec. IA; Conn. Gen. St., 1930, Sec. 5362; Ill.,
L., 1929, p. 134, See. 2; Kan. R. S., Suppl. of 1931, Sec. 20.2204; Ky. Car-
roll's St., 1930, Sec. 1126a-3; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby) 1924, Art. 26, Sec.
76; Mass. Gen. L., 1932, Ch. 221, Sec. 34B; Mich., C. L. 1929, Sec. 13526;
N. C., Code, 1931, Sec. 1461 (E2); N. D., L., 1927, Ch. 124, Sec. 8; Ohio,
Throckmorton's Code, 1930, Sec. 1697-3; R. I., L., 1927, Ch. 1038, Sec. 2;
Texas, L., 1929, Ch. 309, Sec. 6; Va., Code, 1930, Sec. 6571i; Wash., L.,
1925, Ch. 45, Sec. 5; Wis., St., 1930, Sec. 251.18.
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be the real explanation for the majority of the qualifications for
membership.
Obviously the designation of the chairmen of the two judiciary
committees of the legislature as members of the judicial council,
which occurs in Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas,
Washington and Wisconsin, is purely for the purpose of giving
the proposals of the council a more favorable standing before the
legislature. Still more definitely aimed at legislative favor for
the council measures is the Illinois statute drawing two-thirds
of the council from the membership of the senate and house.
Three states include laymen among the members of the coun-
cil. These are Michigan, North Carolina, and Texas, the last
providing that at least one layman should be a journalist. The
proposed act in Mississippi, ss approved by the state bar, has the
same provision as Texas. The purpose in adding laymen is
doubtless to give the council standing with the public, and to dis-
arm criticism, on the theory that the approval of laymen gives
prima facie assurance that the proposals are not for the benefit
of the profession as against the public interest.
A similar impression of fairness is sought to be given by the
large number of judges placed on the councils, their judicial
position clothing them with attributes of impartiality even upon
matters involving their own relations to the public. And in so
far as the courts exercise rule-making power, the important
place on the councils occupied by judges directly contributes to
the probability of the adoption of rules of court proposed.
The confidence and interest of the state bar association is
sought to be enlisted in New Jersey and in Wisconsin by placing
its president upon the council, and in New Jersey, North Dakota,
Texas and Wisconsin by permitting the state bar association to
choose several members of the council. Judge's associations in
Washington and Wisconsin are perhaps expected to be favor-
ably predisposed toward the council by the fact that they choose
some of the council members in those states.
Aside from these instances of a personnel designated with
a definite view of securing support for council proposals, the
sources of the appointing power are so chosen as to exert a simi-
Of the judicial councils organized as agencies of incorporated state
bars, that of South Dakota is directed to mxake recommendations to the
legislature (2 So. Dak. Bar Jour. No. 1, p. 61, July, 1933), and those of
Idaho (1 Ida. L. Jour. 111, May, 1931) and Utah (1 Utah Bar Bull. 54,
Jan., 1932) are directed to report to the state bar.
38 5 Miss. L. Jour. (Nov., 1932) 41.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
lar influence. The governor and the chief justice make most of
the appointments. Both are officers of great importance and
dignity, and presumably will make appointments in the public
interest.
And finally there is the definite purpose, evident in every
judicial council act, to keep the number of practicing lawyers
so small that they will not have a controlling voice in the council.
This can only be construed as a means of assuring the public
that the recommendations of the council will not be too deeply
tinctured by the views of the active bar.
It appears from the foregoing analysis that the miscellaneous
character of the council's personnel and the agencies designated
for its appointment, are employed largely for two purposes- (1)
to provide the council with the data necessary for dealing with
procedural problems, and (2) to create a favorable attitude
toward its proposals and enlist possible support. Neither pur-
pose is adequately served by the means used.
So far as the first purpose is concerned, the plan is almost a
complete failure. The council cannot normally function either
as an oracle or as a research organization. It can expect to
obtain information neither through introspection and intuition
nor through the personal labors of its own members, although,
in regard to the latter, exceptions sometimes occur. It is only
through an investigating organization which it is able to direct,
or by the use of studies made by others, that the council can deal
effectively with the baffling problems of court procedure. The
primary task of the members of the council is to use data not to
collect it. Instead of a heterogeneous membership representing
many limited views, there should be a unified group of broad-
minded and progressive men, all keenly interested in the task of
reform and each able to appreciate the needs of the system as a
whole as well as to pass judgment on the technical requirements
of its various parts.
So far as the second purpose is concerned, the slight advan-
tages gained by drawing in a few legislators and laymen, capi-
talizing the non-partisan nature of the judicial office, enlisting
the languid interest of professional associations by allowing
them to place some of their own members on the council, allay-
ing possible suspicion by keeping the active practitioners at the
bar in a minority on the council, or placing the power of appoint-
ment in the hands of important state officers in whose fairness
the public has confidence, are entirely outweighed by the total
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lack of any constituency for which the council is authorized to
speak.
As commonly organized, the judicial council represents noth-
ing but itself. By scattering its membership among many groups
and interests it secures the allegiance of none. No organization
sponsors its action, no social group shares its responsibility. It
is an isolated unit, having neither administrative power, strong
affiliations, nor institutional support. Such a body lacks the
essential basis for political success. In exceptional cases these
councils have accomplished notable results, owing to favorable
conditions and an unusually able, forceful or distinguished per-
sonnel. But the plan of their organization is inherently weak.
As between the initial task of formulating suitable measures
for reform, and the final task of securing their adoption, the
former is vastly easier of accomplishment.
The collection of statistics proceeds almost automatically, once
a system is adopted. Means for making special studies of par-
ticular problems are available to an extent hardly realized. Law
schools, research institutes, the great charitable foundations,
bar associations, legislative commissions, municipal bureaus,
civic organizations, political and social science groups, and gov-
ernment departments, all supply excellent facilities, in addition
to those which the judicial councils themselves may have the
means and the desire to organize. An immense wealth of mater-
ial has already been collected and published, and can be obtained
by any council wishing to examine it. Its bulk and value are
increasing rapidly. A National Conference of Judicial Councils
has been organized largely as a clearing house of information
regarding methods for improving the administration of jus-
tice.39
It is the final task which should cause concern. After definite
and meritorious proposals for reform have been prepared, how
can they be given operative effect? This is a political, not a
legal, problem. The best seed, if it falls on stony ground, will
produce nothing.
If technical knowledge is to be brought into proper relations
with political power, the burden of the task must be borne by
those who understand the technique. The entire legal profes-
sion shares in that knowledge. The future of the whole pro-
fession is at stake. One part cannot say to another, I have no
39 13 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. (1929) 102; 14 Id. (1930) 77.
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need of you. Bench and bar together administer the same rules,
participate in the same decisions, and share equally in the praise
or blame accorded by the public. The position of the judge upon
the bench is no more stable than that of the lawyer at the bar.
Without business for lawyers there will be no use for courts,
and, it might be added, no need for law schools.
It is clear that the profession can neither let the matter drift
nor leave the responsibility to others. The only effective agency
for reform is one which will adequately represent the profession,
and will merit and receive its united support.
A judicial council which could speak with the approval and
organized support of the entire profession would occupy a posi-
tion of dignity and influence. It could become a mediating
agency between the public and the profession, to which com-
plaints, criticisms and. suggestions regarding the operation of
the legal system could be brought by chambers of commerce,
trade and business associations, civic bodies of various kinds
and individual citizens. It could deal with legislative bodies
frankly and openly, thereby assuming the burden, which it
ought to carry, of convincing the public and its legislative rep-
resentatives that the measures which it proposes are in the inter-
est of the people as well as of the profession.
Consciousness of professional responsibility has been slow to
develop in the United States. Continental Europe has far sur-
passed us in the professional morale of their organized bars.
The Inns of Court have had a powerful influence in maintaining
the high professional standards of the English bar. Bar integra-
tion is just beginning in the United States. Discipline of its
members has so far been its primary and almost exclusive pur-
pose.40 But if the profession is to publicly accept official respon-
sibility for improving the quality of its personnel, there is no
reason why it should decline a similar responsibility for the qual-
ity of its technique.
The recent experience of Illinois in revolutionizing its system
of judicial procedure, throws an interesting light upon the com-
parative vitality of an independently constituted judicial council
and a group representing the organized legal profession. In that
40 A number of the bar incorporation acts, in defining the powers and
duties of the bar or of its board of governors, are silent upon the subject
of improving the administration of justice, and relate entirely to the organ-
ization, conduct and disbarment of members. Alabama, Code, 1928, Sees.
6220-6260; North Carolina, P. L., 1933, Ch. 210; North Dakota, C. L. Suppl.
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state, not only the initiative in proposing a complete revision of
the practice, but also the entire labor of working out its details
and the responsibility for securing its adoption by the legisla-
ture, were undertaken and carried by the bar associations of the
city of Chicago and of the state of Illinois, 41 notwithstanding
the fact that the state had a judicial council charged by the legis-
lature with the duty "to study the laws of this state in the fields
of judicial organization, criminal law, criminal procedure and
civil procedure, ascertain the defects thereof and consider the
means of remedying such defects." The council was expressly
"empowered to draft a revision of the statutes of this state, or
any part thereof, so far as relates to the several fields of law
above mentioned, and to prepare any and all forms of bills
deemed necessary to carry out its recommendations." It was
authorized "to engage such clerical, expert and other assistance
as its work may require," and it was supplied with an appropria-
tion of $5,000.00 a year.4 2
Professional activity in all fields is becoming a more and more
important element in modern life.4 3 There is a continuity in
professional endeavor, a tradition of professional responsibility,
and an idealism inherent in professional association, which so-
ciety can ill afford to lose. A wise public policy will conserve
and utilize this source of power. A legal profession definitely
and effectively organized to bring about a better administration
of justice would not only serve its own interests but would confer
an inestimable benefit upon society.
1925, Secs. 782-813; New Mexico, Ann. St., 1929, Secs. 9-201 to 9-212;
Washington, L., 1933, Ch. 94.
A few acts merely mention the matter in a single sentence, declaring
that the board shall have the power to aid in the advance of the science
of jurisprudence and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
California, Gen. L., 1931, Act 591; Idaho, Code, 1932, Sec. 3-419; Nevada,
Comp. L., 1929, Sec. 592; Oklahoma, Stat., 1931, Secs. 4232.
The Mississippi act, L., 1932, Ch. 121, Sec. 24, makes it the duty of the
bar to recommend to the legislature such changes in the law as are deemed
advisable for improving the administration of justice. The Utah Act,
Rev. Stat., 1933, Sec. 6-0-19, requires the bar to make recommendations
for changes in procedure to the governor, legislature or supreme court.
The South Dakota act, L., 1931, Sec. 4232, seems to imply a desire on the
part of the legislature to obtain the views of the bar upon the judicial
system.
41 Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (1933) Introduction, pp. IV-V.
42 fll., L., 1929, p. 134.
43 The Professions, by A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson (1933).
